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Maxwell]. Mehlman 
Genetic Enhancement: Plan Now to Act Later 
ABSTRACT. All three main articles in the issues of the Kennedy Institute of 
Ethics Journal endorse the view that genetic enhancement should be permitted, 
including human germ-line genetic enhancement. However, unregulated, wealth-
based access to genetic enhancement in general, and germ-line enhancement in 
particular, would create intolerable risks for society. Although there are anum-
ber of practical problems raised by proposals to regulate or restrict access to 
genetic enhancement, which will make it difficult if not impossible to muster 
support for any effective restrictions until we begin to experience the societal 
problems that genetic enhancement will create, it is important to consider now 
what restrictions would be appropriate, how they would be imposed, and what 
changes would be needed in existing laws and institutions to facilitate them. 
Without this type of groundwork, there is no way society will be in a position to 
act in time. 
T he articles by Robert Loftis (2005), Fritz Allhoff (2005), and Ronald Lindsay (2005) in this issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics journal demonstrate how hard it will be to assure just ac-
cess to scarce genetic enhancement technologies. If, as a result of their 
cost or other supply constraints, it is not possible to give them to every-
one, how should they be distributed? 
Allhoff focuses on germ-line genetic enhancement, which most com-
mentators regard as the most objectionable. He starts by arguing that 
genetic enhancement is not inherently immoral. His conclusion is sound, 
although he uses two examples, both from Erik Parens, that are problem-
atic. The first is genetic enhancement in sports. As I have argued else-
where (Mehlman 2004 ), the ethical rules governing sports and games dif-
fer fundamentally from the rules governing other sorts of competitive 
activities. Allhoff's second example is genetic intervention to prevent or 
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retard aging. There is a vigorous debate underway about whether aging is 
natural and desirable or pathological; those who subscribe to the latter 
view would deem anti-aging interventions to be therapy rather than en-
hancement. 
Allhoff maintains that, although germ-line genetic enhancement is not 
inherently objectionable, it must be distributed in an ethical manner. He 
is confident that society will have enough time "to prepare for its dis-
bursement by making appropriate policy adjustments" (Allhoff 2005, p. 
45), and he boldly suggests the guiding principle upon which these policy 
adjustments should be based: "[G]erm-line genetic enhancements are 
morally permissible if and only if they augment primary goods ... " (p. 
50, emphasis in original). One problem is to determine what counts as a 
. primary good. A primary good, in Allhoff's (and Rawls's) opinion, is some-
thing that would be desired by all rational agents. One need not worry 
that parents will try to create star basketball players, Allhoff asserts, be-
cause one of the main traits that is associated with this type of athletic 
prowess-height-is not a primary good, since not everyone would de-
sire to be tall. Likewise, skin color, eye color, and sex. On the other hand, 
improvements in eyesight, speed, strength, and mental abilities are pri-
mary goods. But it is not clear that everyone would want to be fast or 
strong, especially if this interfered with being deliberate or delicate. Nor 
is it clear that rational agents who perceived that skin color or gender 
were instrumental in determining whether they suffered severe discrimi-
nation would forgo the opportunity to alter those traits. 
Loftis's article criticizes our society's preoccupation with the ethics of 
futuristic human germ-line genetic enhancement, when far more immedi-
ate ethical issues are raised by the current practice of nonhuman germ-
line modification. When he does address human germ-line enhancement, 
he uses two questionable examples: retardation of aging and enhanced 
immunity from disease. As noted earlier, if aging is regarded as pathologi-
cal, then interventions that retard aging can be thought of as therapeutic 
rather than enhancing. As for immunity from disease, Eric Juengst (1998) 
has argued that, although the result would be to endow individuals with 
super-normal immune systems, the intervention should be deemed therapy 
rather than enhancement since its goal is to prevent disease. More impor-
tantly, Loftis assumes away the distributive justice problem by proposing 
public funding for free distribution of enhancements. This indeed would 
solve the problem, but would be prohibitively expensive. Perhaps recog-
nizing this, Loftis (2005, p. 68) proposes in addition that social structures 
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be tailored so that "they continue to include the unenhanced." He does 
not elaborate what he has in mind, but it may well be similar to sugges-
tions I have made to level the playing field in certain wmpetitive circum-
stances, such as by making the enhanced fiduciaries for the unenhanced 
(Mehlman 2003). 
Lindsay's provocative proposal is to table the question of how to dis-
tribute access to genetic enhancements until the· technologies are avail-
able. More specifically, along with the other authors in this collection, he 
thinks that society should not, at present, attempt to restrict development 
of or access to genetic enhancement. He puts forth four arguments in 
support of his position. In response to the suggestions of myself and oth-
ers that wealth-based access to genetic enhancement would confer intol-
erably unfair competitive advantages on the enhanced, Lindsay points 
out that individuals might seek genetic enhancement for noncompetitive 
reasons, such as self-actualization, and argues that it would be unjust to 
prevent them from doing so. Since there is no "defensible way" to distin-
guish competitive from self-actualizing enhancement, Lindsay concludes 
that it would be unjust to restrict access to genetic enhancement. To his 
credit, he acknowledges the flaw in his argument: the same enhancement 
technologies that permit self-actualization also provide competitive ad-
vantages. If, as I have maintained, wealth-based access to these advan-
tages is likely to destroy liberal democratic society, his "prima facie moral 
right" to the pursuit of self-improvement is easily trumped by the neces-
sity of maintaining a society in which such moral rights may be freely 
exercised. 
Another of Lindsay's arguments rejects the possibility that injustice can 
be avoided a Ia Rawls by distributing access to genetic enhancement to 
the worst off. On this he and I agree: such a scheme would raise serious 
conceptual and practical difficulties. My only criticism of his argument is 
that he uses "severely cognitively impaired" to characterize those who 
might be deemed the worst-off. But since these individuals are cognitively 
impaired, genetically increasing their intelligence would be gene therapy 
rather than genetic enhancement. 
Lindsay's third argument is that the feanhat wealth-based genetic en-
hancement will destroy liberal democratic society is greatly exaggerated, 
since "[g]enetic aristocracies will not seize power overnight." But the is-
sue is not the speed of the coup, but its impact on socie_ty. Indeed, there is 
a real peril in slowing down the introduction of genetic enhancement. We 
may wake up one morning and discover that, although the enhanced did 
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not seize power overnight, they did so incrementally without our realizing 
or preventing it. In either case, the consequences for society would be dire. 
Lindsay's final argument is his most provocative: If one assumes that 
genetic enhancement will radically transform society, one cannot know 
what justice would look like in a post-enhancement society. Therefore, it 
would be improper to restrict enhancement in the interest of distributive 
justice, because one cannot tell in advance whether the effect of the re-
strictions would be just. Envisioning a post-enhancement society in which 
the enhanced constituted a separate and noninterdependent species, Lind-
say asserts that the enhanced will no more owe moral obligations to the 
unenhanced than people owe moral obligations to animals. 
Lindsay's first error is to assume that the only polity-threatening form 
of genetic enhancement is that which creates a new species. Although I 
and others have raised the new species concern, far less radical wealth-
based genetic alterations would undermine western democratic society 
by destroying the belief in equality of opportunity. His second mistake is 
to adopt a static conception of society as pre- and post-enhancement. The 
effect of genetic enhancement will be dynamic, and there are clearly jus-
tice implications in moving from one distributive state to another, since 
some people gain while others lose. Finally, Lindsay seems to assume that, 
so long as society does not restrict wealth-based access to genetic en-
hancement, it is not opting for a particular distribution scheme. But of 
course it is: It is endorsing a wealth-based approach. Perhaps this is his 
underlying goal. "Only if and when the requisite technology evolves," he 
writes, "will one be able to make sound judgments about the require-
ments of justice"(Lindsay 2005, p. 7). But by then, only the rich will be 
enhanced, and it is doubtful and altogether too dangerous to suppose 
that they would voluntarily share their advantages with anyone else. 
Collectively, then, all three of articles endorse the view that genetic 
enhancement should be permitted, including human germ-line genetic 
enhancement. Lindsay takes a laissez-faire approach, or perhaps what 
can be better described as a "wait-and-see laissez-faire" approach. Loftis 
is convinced that any justice concerns can be dealt with by providing free 
access and leveling the playing field, and Allhoff would limit genetic en-
hancement to what he regards as primary goods. 
None of these articles shakes my conviction that unregulated, wealth-
based access to genetic enhancement in general, and germ-line enhance-
ment in particular, would create intolerable risks for society. Despite his 
permissive arguments, Lindsay at one point seems to share my concerns. 
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MEHLMAN • GENETIC ENHANCEMENT: PLAN NOW TO ACT LATER 
He admits that "nothing [he has said] implies that we should not act to 
prevent the creation of a genetic aristocracy. My main point," he explains, 
"is that fears of a genetic aristocracy do not justify the 'drawing of red 
lines' that would result in the prohibition of genetic enhancements at the 
present time" (Lindsay 2005, p. 32). He adds: 
I am opposed to the preemptive strike approach; its use in the area of bio-
technology is as troubling and questionable as it is in the area of interna-
tional relations. As I stated at the beginning of this section, we should be 
able to take appropriate action to manage the consequences of genetic in-
terventions as they evolve, and we certainly will be in a better position to 
evaluate the consequences after they take place. (Lindsay 2005, p. 32) 
Lindsay correctly identifies a number of practical problems raised by 
proposals to regulate or restrict access to genetic enhancement, including 
my own suggestions. As he points out, these problems will make it diffi-
cult if not impossible to muster support for any effective restrictions until 
we begin to experience the societal problems that genetic enhancement 
will create. On this we agree. The objective of my work is not to insist 
that we impose these restrictions right now, but that we consider what 
they might be, how they would be imposed, and what changes would be 
needed in existing laws and institutions to facilitate them. Without this 
type of groundwork, there is no way society will be in a position "to take 
appropriate action to manage the consequences of genetic interventions," 
as Lindsay (2005, p. 32) puts it. 
Unlike Lindsay, however, I am extremely worried that society will not 
act in time. Bearing in mind that the consequences of unregulated wealth-
based access to genetic enhancement could mean the destruction of the 
liberal state, it will be far too late to wait to act until after, to use his 
phrase, the consequences have taken place. The trick is to figure out how 
to know when the time to act is right. For this decision makers need well-
designed surveillance mechanisms, constant vigilance, and suitable soci-
etal telltales-" canaries in the mine," as my colleague Eric J uengst is fond 
of saying. What society cannot afford is a blase attitude, which is what 
the adoption of Lindsay's perspective would promote. 
If my concerns about the societal consequences of genetic enhance-
ment are justified, then decision makers also must pay particular atten-
tion to the risks posed by germ-line interventions. Allhoff and Loftis, who 
defend germ-line enhancement, pay no attention to the much greater threat 
that inherited as opposed to acquired advantages pose to liberal democ-
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racy. Granted, restricting germ-line enhancement entails interfering with 
cherished notions of procreative liberty and privacy. These values council 
caution and care, not indifference. If there is a way to minimize the intru-
siveness of our controls, then let us find them. But society must begin to 
consider how to avoid the dangers of a genobility now, not wait until the 
dangers are realized. 
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